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ABSTRACT
An important area in digital forensics is images of hard disks. The correct production of the images as
well as the integrity and authenticity of each hard disk image is essential for the probative force of the
image to be used at court. Integrity and authenticity are under suspicion as digital evidence is stored
and used by software based systems. Modifications to digital objects are hard or even impossible to
track and can occur even accidentally. Even worse, vulnerabilities occur for all current computing
systems. Therefore, it is difficult to guarantee a secure environment for forensic investigations. But
intended deletions of dedicated data of disk images are often required because of legal issues in many
countries.
This article provides a technical framework on the protection of the probative force of hard disk
images by ensuring the integrity and authenticity using state of the art technology. It combines
hardware-based security, cryptographic hash functions and digital signatures to achieve a continuous
protection of the image together with a reliable documentation of the status of the device that was used
for image creation. The framework presented allows to detect modifications and to pinpoint the exact
area of the modification to the digital evidence protecting the probative force of the evidence at a
whole. In addition, it also supports the deletion of parts of images without invalidating the retained
data blocks.
Keywords: digital evidence, probative force hard disk image, verifiable deletion of image data, trusted
imaging software
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1. INTRODUCTION
To prepare and conduct court proceedings, more and more digital information is needed (Raghavan
2013; Saudi 2001). It is therefore common practice to generate images of entire drives (Garfinkel,
2006). In contrast to backups, an image also contains information about the file system structure of the
original data carrier, including the master boot record, since raw data and not just individual files are
copied. The use of images instead of physical hard disks for forensic investigations has the advantage
that the owner of the hard disk can continue to use the disk after the image was taken. This is
particularly relevant for companies that depend on the data on the disks. Long-term confiscation of
computers and hard-drives can potentially ruin a company. Nevertheless, the forensic investigation on
the basis of the image needs to preserve the integrity of the image and the process needs to ensure that
no alterations and changes can be done. In many countries legal issues enforc
data that means private and intimate information in form of documents, photos, audio files and
videos.
Obviously, disk images are just digital data and thus they are in principle easy to change. Exact
manipulations are difficult or even impossible to notice on raw image data. Generating, storing and
using images therefore require special care so that the images can serve as suitable digital evidence.
However, all current tools provide no protection against malicious or deliberate changes to the images.
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image or the time of generation.
The current process for forensic evaluation of hard disks assumes that all staff dealing with the image
is trustworthy and has no motivation to maliciously change the image. Further, it also assumes that the
computers used in the process are secure and only accessible by trusted staff. Both assumptions should
be called into question. It might be true in most cases that the investigators are trusted and will not
manipulate the image data. Nevertheless, with the current process and forensic tools they can easily
change images without any chance of someone being able to prove that the image is not the correct
one. All technical solutions (e.g., no-write during image creation, check-sums, hash values, no
functions to change image in forensic software) only target accidental change. In general, one might
assume that in some cases investigators have some incentive to manipulate data, either to get personal
advantages or to harm the owner of the hard-drive. Security of the used devices is also critical.
Investigators use standard computing platforms for the creation and evaluation of disk images. These
devices can potentially be attacked in many different ways. Remote access, malware running on the
device or combinations with social attacks can be used to maliciously change the image data.
Current regulations do not demand stronger security for digital evidence in forensic investigations.
Guidelines established by the German BSI (2011) require integrity protection as realized by current
forensic tools but technical solutions to preserve authenticity of the image are not considered. Reviews
of current forensic software by NIST1, NIST (2012) show that only cryptographic hash algorithms
(e.g., SHA1) are available for integrity protection. No digital signatures, time-stamps or binding to
status of the used devices are considered in any of the existing tools.
Clearly, various organizational issues need to be considered for the collection and use of digital
evidence. Andrew (2007) defined such a process for images of storage data. In general, one can
identify the following steps:





1

Who came into contact, handled, and discovered the digital evidence?
What were the procedures that were used to identify and collect the evidence?
Where was the digital evidence discovered, collected, handled, stored, and examined?
At what time was the digital evidence discovered, accessed, collected, examined,
archived, or transferred?

Computer forensics tool testing (cftt) project web site http://www.cftt.nist.gov/
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What was the reason to collect this particular evidence?
Which technology was used to collect, examine, and store the digital evidence?
How was the evidence protected from changes and manipulations?

All these different items are relevant. However, the contribution of this paper concentrates on the
technology used to securely create images for storage devices and to protect them against accidental
and malicious changes. The second aspect is to describe a procedure to ensure that deletion of core
area data (private and intimate data) on the disk image is explicit comprehensible.
A significant discussion for the development of producing, securing, handling and maintaining digital
and digitized evidence from the technical as well as from the legal side was discussed with experts
from Europe, US, South Africa and Australia during a Dagstuhl Seminar in February 20142. New
requirements and next steps in research have been discussed and will be documented in a Dagstuhl
Manifesto. Aspects of this paper will be taken into account for these developments.
2. DIGITAL DATA MODIFICATION
It is not only intentionally that digital data may be changed as Pinheiro et al. (2007) described. They
may also vary randomly and spontaneously due to errors in the program that generates the disk
images, or because of damage to the medium on which an image is stored (physical errors). Errors in
the operating system may give the user the impression that image data altered (logical error) during the
forensic investigation. When generating an image, it is important to distinguish between a physical
image and a logical image. An image on the physical level duplicates data according to their actual
storage on the respective hard drive or other relevant media. A logical image, on the other hand,
provides the duplication of the data, as they are available to the operating system. Disks use error
correction mechanisms to detect defective memory areas independently and exclude these areas when
saving data. Data is stored in different physical conditions in different places. This process of mapping
these different physical conditions to indistinguishable images cannot be retraced from the outside. To
m
s
g
qu m s
y’s pp
s
mp v
b y, m
p
g
systems use intelligent techniques to secure data on multiple disks. In UNIX and Linux operating
systems, which are predominantly installed on servers, it is possible to create dynamically adjustable
partitions (logical volumes), which may extend over several disk drives. The size of these virtual disks
changes, even if data has already been stored in the logical volume. A redundant array of independent
disks (RAID) serves to organize several physical disks of a computer into a logical drive. This
provides for higher data availability in the event of individual hard drive failures and for better data
access than a single physical drive would. In both technologies an image of such a disk array is
therefore per se not a one to one copy, because the deposition on various storage media is not visible
to image generation p g ms. T p g m s us
“b v
ss
sk,
even though the data is stored on multiple disks. The program does not generate an image then, but
stores data anew on the backup medium instead.
The assumption that an image represents a realistic copy of a disk may therefore be deceptive because
conventional programs only generate an image on the logical level. The physical details of the storage
(the location on the hard disk or on a specific disk in a storage system), however, are not recognized
by the program and will consequently not be logged either. Actually, a real copy at a physical level is
in many cases not possible. Additional problems are introduced by technologies such as the integration
of virtual drives over the Internet or the use of self-encrypting hard drives. In either case, the image
available is a logical one. During the production of said image it needs to be documented that the
image generated is a correct copy of the physically stored data in terms of content.

2

http://www.dagstuhl.de/de/programm/kalender/semhp/?semnr=14092
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3. IMAGE GENERATION TOOLS
Several programs and tools exist to generate images from given hard disks. One, that is commonly
used tools by law enforcement institutions to generate an image, is the FTK Imager 3. It allows
generating images in various formats and supports the forensic analysis of the images. In the
following, only the generation of an image using this program will be considered, the forensic analysis
will be ignored.
The FTK Imager has no protection mechanism to recognize data changes during their transit to a new
medium or to detect subsequent changes in the archive. The user can therefore only assume that he has
established a 1:1 copy of the data carrier to be backed up. State Offices for Criminal Investigation
argue that the image may still be trusted because the FTK Imager itself does not provide any means to
change data at a later point in time, ignoring that a change is possible with only minimal effort. For
example, it is possible to re-insert a previously generated image pretending to be its own drive and
w
u
FTK Im g
z g , b us
ASR D ’s Expert Witness Compression
format, (Knight, 2011), does not provide any effective techniques for detecting subsequent changes.
Mechanisms used for integrity protection are CRC and the MD5 hash function. After a modification
both CRC and MD5 hashes can easily be recalculated, so that changes cannot be detected by means of
these values. The necessary technologies are already an integral part of any operating system. Such an
attack could come from an investigator, but any administrator or other person with access to the
evidence can perform such a change both easily and quickly.
Based on the grounds that the possibility to change secured Images with the FTK Imager does not
really exist, State Offices for Criminal Investigation do not deem it necessary to document the image
generation process, but claim further- more that data cannot be deleted selectively from images, not
even evidentiary irrelevant or exempt data, such as highly personal information.
The AFF Format provides a mechanism to split the image into smaller segments called pages,
(Garfinkel, 2006). Even though AFF supports page signing with digital signatures, it does not support
further modification as well. This means that there is no built-in support for a later reproduction of
undertaken steps, e.g., deletion of privacy sensible data. A lightweight tool for forensic purposes is the
patch for GNU dd called dc3dd4. It is able to split an image into smaller pieces and to generate a hash
value for each of these pieces, but it does not support a cryptographic signature by a single investigator
nor a PKI infrastructure. It can be seen, that these mentioned tools fail to log an investigators action.
Steps undertaken could be logged manually, but this is error-prone, arduous and depends upon the
investigators expertise. Even worse, a malicious investigator can easily trick the programs and delete
or modify data in the process of image creation. With regards to the ACPO guidelines5, our goal is to
automate the logging process and prevent errors and misuse in the creation and handling of forensic
images.
4. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROBATIVE GENERATION OF IMAGES
Images of hard disks are just digital data that shall be used as digital evidence. Therefore, generation
and storage of images shall follow the same rules as they are currently discussed for digital evidence
in general. These requirements are concerned with the device that was used to create the image and the
protection of the image itself. One possible definition is provided by Kuntze et al. (2012):
A data record can be considered secure if a device for which the following holds authentically created
the digital evidence of it:


The device is physically protected to ensure at least tamper-evidence.

3

http://www.accessdata.com/products/digital-forensics/ftk
http://sourceforge.net/projects/dc3dd/
5
http://www.forensic-computing.ltd.uk/ACPO%20Guide%20v3.0.pdf
4
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The data record is securely bound to the identity and status of the device (including running
software and configuration) and to all other relevant parameters (such as time, temperature,
location, users in- volved, etc. 6).
The data record has not been changed after creation.

Consequently, integrity protection against unintentional changes is not sufficient. In contrast, the
authenticity of the image creation process needs to be preserved and documented. Parameters to be
documented and securely bound to the image include the software running on the device, persons
controlling and authorizing the creation of the image or the creation time of the image. If the exact
time is important, it might be required to use a trusted time source, e.g., an external time authority to
time-stamp image data. In principle, images shall not be modified at all. Nevertheless, in some cases
the law might prescribe modifications. Some parts of the image might contain private information. In
this case, the information should not be stored and should be deleted. Current practice is to store
complete images in contradiction to laws and privacy regulations. For example, the Constitutional
Court has decided, that these kinds of private and intimate data are not allowed to use for investigation
purposes and it is not allowed to collect such information. In case that such data is already stored,
actions must be executed, do delete all of affected from any medium as well as from the court record.
This has to be done under consideration of keeping the probative force of the hard disk image 7. Thus,
a proper image creation needs to support the documentation of the deletion of data within the image
without invalidating the probative force of the remaining parts of the image.
5. TECHNOLOGICAL BUILDING BLOCKS
This section will introduce a set of building blocks that allows providing solutions fit for the
requirements presented in the previous section. The main focus of this section lies within presenting a
scheme protecting the integrity and authenticity of digital evidence with respect to the case of hard
disk images. Additionally, a solution for a documented deletion of data is shown and the overall
process documentation is discussed. Finally, some thoughts on the handling of images derived from
multiple hard disks (e.g., for RAID arrays that combine multiple disk drive components into a logical
unit) are introduced.
5.1 Integrity Protection
As discussed above, integrity protection always requires the protection of authenticity of the creation
or of authorized changes to the data. Today, digital signatures are used to provide the authenticity of
digital data. These signatures apply broadly to various scenarios such as long term archiving. To
protect integrity and authenticity of digital evidence, first a digital hash is created using a hash
algorithm like SHA-1, SHA-2 or other accredited standard, e.g., through NIST. This hash value
p s
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y signed using algorithms like RSA,
Jonsson, Kaliski (2003), in the PKCS standard or others accepted by a public authority like NIST8.
The most basic approach to protect a hard disk image is to create one hash value for the complete
image and then sign this hash value. In case of a modification the hash value of the modified image is
different to the signed value. But as the hash applies to the whole image, a modification cannot be
traced to a single part of the image. As a result, using only parts of the image during a forensic
evaluations and deleting the unused or forbidden parts is not possible. The hash value would be
changed which will result in a diminished probative force of it.
To allow for the tracing of modifications, the image can be regarded as a sequence of individual units
(slices). For each unit an individual hash can be calculated. For a sequence of all these individual hash
6

The actual set of parameters and the protection levels depend on the scenarios and on the type of data record
http://heinrich.rewi.hu-berlin.de/doc/strpr/29_beweisverwertungsverbote_4.pdf
8
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/index.html
7
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values a new hash can then be created and signed. This method is known as a hash tree and is used in
several applications, for example in the area of long term archival, Kunz et al. (2008). Depending on
the protection level the appropriate size for the individual units needs to be specified. As files are
stored on the basis of clearly identified slices, a straightforward proposal is to use the block size also
as the unit size for the hash values.
This hash tree now allows comparing the hash value for each individual slice with the reference as
signed. Any modification can be tracked into an individual slice and therefore the file modified can be
determined. If a finer granularity is required or techniques like block sub-allocation, Claar et al. (2000)
are to be covered more precise strategies for the determination of the hashes need to be developed.
Digital signatures and the tree of hashes as used in the proposed scheme are stored independently of
the image. Thus, any tool for the creation and validation of the protective digital signatures can be
used in parallel with other existing tools for forensic investigations. This allows for an easy integration
of additional protection schemes into existing forensic processes.
5.2 Data Deletion
The procedure described also permits to delete evidence-irrelevant or exempt data at a later point in
time, i.e., to execute a deliberate data modification. To allow for the deletion of data, it is required that
the deletion is documented and can be associated to the person who performed the deletion. Deleting
information in an image is basically a modification to the image by writing zeros into the specific parts
of the image that contain these information and thus destroying them. Such a modification can be
clearly documented using the digital signature scheme as presented above.
Using the approach of a hash tree having an individual hash for each slice, in the deletion process the
modified blocks can be documented using a list identifying each slice modified. This list shows for
each modified slice the previous hash value and the new hash value. While verifying an image with
deletions, every time a slice does not meet the expected hash value the verification process queries the
list of modifications. If a slice was deleted, the original hash value for this slice is used for the
verification. Thus, the original hash value can only be recreated if all other slices have not been
changed. To document the deletion, a new hash value has to be formed and signed (deletion signature)
after the deletion was carried out, so that the authenticity of other image data can be determined using
the interaction between the original image signature and the erasure signature. It is documented that at
the time of deletion a particular slice had a specific content, expressed by the hash value of the slice. In
the context of this deletion, the slice is overwritten with a predetermined content. The deletion
signature now says that a slice had a different content before the deletion, and who overwrote that
content. During the examination of the image the altered slices stand out due to an erroneous hash
value. This slice is then looked up in the deletion signature and the original value is used in the
subsequent calculations, as provided by the deletion signature.
5.3 Process Documentation
In the process of the acquisition of a hard disk image, the core root of trust is the person creating the
image in the first place. The correct execution of the process including a proper handling of the hard
disk and the software involved in the data extraction depends on the people involved. Within this
process the person creating the disk image vouch for the correct execution and normally express this
by signing a written protocol.
To technically bind the image creation to a person, the person creating the image personally signs it by
applying a personalized digital signature. This requires a specific key infrastructure and guidelines on
signature creation on the side of the administration. The ESIGN act defines an electronic signature as
follows for the United States (Knaus and Foley, 2001). Other countries have similar regulations on the
definition of a non-handwritten signature.
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associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign
the record.
To legit the electronic resp. digital signature it must be clear that the signature belongs to the user
signing the document. Typically a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), see Maurer (1996) is used to
establish on a technical and organizational level this relation. Additionally a signature creation device,
according to CEN (2001) is required to produce the signed data set.
Additionally, the creation time of a specific image needs to be documented in the signature of the
image complementing the information on the person involved. To allow for a time stamp a reference
time is required and in most countries already available. A public time stamp authority provides
signatures with a time embedded for data sent to the authority.
A second core root of trust is the software used in the process of image creation. The imaging software
needs to be trustworthy to ensure that the image created is in accordance to the requirements towards
digital evidence. To document the process proof on the software used is part of the information
endorsed in the image signatures. Novel approaches towards security architectures as developed by the
Trusted Computing Group (TCG)9 allow for a trustworthy documentation of software running on a
system and the reporting towards a verifier later.
An important aspect in the documentation of software used in the image creation process is the
certification of the software as result of an evaluation process. In this evaluation process existing
software is tested by an official authority to ensure the usability of the software. One example hereby
is the work of the Computer Forensics Tool Testing (CFTT) work group of NIST10 providing a list of
software tested. To support the verification of images and the process performed the existing
infrastructure like the CFTT would need to publish version specific digital signatures allowing for an
automated process on the basis of the technology provided by the TCG.
The underlying idea in the application of TCG technology in the area of the creation of digital
evidence is to document the software of the extraction process with each hard disk image, Herbert et
al. (2006). Later an expert witness can determine from the documented software what possible
modifications were possible during the creation. It is then also possible to determine the applicability
of the software on the basis of assessments provided through the public evaluation (e.g., through
NIST).
5.4 Handling of Multiple Hard Disks
In systems using different logical volumes (LVM), Hasenstein (2001) or different disks (RAID)
Patterson et al. (1989), at first, a hash value has to be determined and digitally signed for each volume
or each disk, respectively, followed by generating the new image. This image then must be assigned a
hash value and signed digitally, making the connection between the individual data slices and the
image re-constructible.
The generation of hash values and their signatures, however, do not solve the issue whether the image
data is displayed actually unchanged (logical error) to the user in the forensic investigation. When
evaluating the data, the image data will now be treated as a drive. Individual files are distributed over
logical slices in the image and w b “ ss mb
, jus s y w u
v . A xp mus
certify the software used for this process and its correct functioning must be proven.
If a single file is extracted from the image, the correlation to the image needs to be documented as
well. As a minimum approach a signature can be used, stating who generated this file from which
9

http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
http://www.cftt.nist.gov/
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image slices. In this case the signature would be formed with respect to the file, the signature of the
image (or a hash value of these data) and the relevant image slices. Moreover, it is desirable that the
software used be documented in the signature as well. Another issue is the proper presentation of the
data. For example, documents from word processors are displayed with different content depending on
the version of the program used. In case of doubt, an accurate analysis of the original data will have to
be carried out and documented.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The integrity of digital evidence objects is central to the evaluation of the currently used process for
the creation of images for storage devices. Current forensic tools do not use state-of-the art technology
for the protection of images. Their weak protection mechanisms only cover accidental changes to
image data.
However, the well-established state-of-the-art of technology provides solutions for the detection of
deliberate or accidental alterations of digital evidence objects, the secure documentation of the state of
the devices and software that was used to create the image, but also the deletion of irrelevant or
exempt data at a later point in time, without affecting the protection of evidentiary data. Implementing
these additional security measures is easy and straightforward. Furthermore, the technology can
complement existing forensic tools without the necessity of a full integration into these tools. The
described protection techniques can be implemented as separate software, since none of the protection
techniques deals with actual creation process or evaluation process of the image itself.
Hash functions and digital signatures do not change the image. Further, they can be stored separated
from the actual image data. Thus, the additional security measures will have no impact on the quality
of the data itself during the backup process. Also existing solutions for presentation issues of image
data and documentation are not affected. Interfaces can be easily defined to link extracted data to
particular slices in order to also integrate deletion of private or unnecessary data from the stored
image.
In summary, the law perspective should be aware of the technological state of the art and must create a
clear demand for secure solutions and for solutions that are compliant with basic laws on people’s
privacy and on data retention.
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